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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The government appeals the order of the District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing a five- 
count indictment against Robert Sherman in which he was 
charged with committing perjury before a federal grand jury 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1621. The district court held that 
the prosecution improperly charged Sherman under that 
general perjury statute rather than the more specific false 
declarations statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1623, thereby denying him 
the ability to assert the recantation defense available under 
18 U.S.C. S 1623(d). For the reasons that follow, we will 
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
I. Statement of Facts 
 
On October 23, 1996, Robert J. Sherman was indicted on 
five counts of perjury under 18 U.S.C. S 1621. The 
indictment stemmed from Sherman's testimony in the 
medical malpractice trial of Samuel and Gail Gassert v. Latif 
Awad, M.D. and Geisinger Medical Center. Sherman- a 
longtime obstetrician/gynecologist - had testified as the 
plaintiffs' medical expert in that trial. When cross examined 
about his qualifications as an expert, Sherman had testified 
that he was licensed to practice medicine in the District of 
Columbia, Virginia and Massachusetts and that none of his 
licenses had ever been revoked, suspended or restricted. 
App. at 63. He further testified that he had never been 
subject to any disciplinary proceedings by any hospital or 
medical society. App. at 62. He did, however, acknowledge 
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that he had once been named in a medical malpractice case 
fifteen years earlier, involving a problem with a"D & C",1 
but he described it as "routine." App. at 63. When Sherman 
provided that testimony, he knew that all of his licenses 
had been revoked, and defense counsel ultimately elicited 
this admission from Sherman. Because that testimony is at 
the heart of this appeal, we will quote the relevant exchange 
at length: 
 
       Q: At the present time you are licensed to practice 
       medicine in Virginia. 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Over the course of your practice, which has been 
       about how many years now? 
 
       A: Thirty years. 
 
       Q: Okay, over the course of your practice, how many 
       states have you ever been licensed to practice in? 
 
       A: I was licensed in Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, 
       and D.C. 
 
       Q: And you've continued to keep your license current 
       in Virginia. 
 
       A: That's all. 
 
       Q: Do you remember at the time of your retirement in 
       1985, do you remember what states you had licenses 
       in? 
 
       A: I don't have that handy at the moment. 
 
       Q: Well, were you licensed to practice medicine in 
       Virginia in 1985? 
 
       A: Yes. yes. 
 
       Q: How about Massachusetts? 
 
       A: I moved away from Massachusetts so I didn't bother 
       with that. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The abbreviation "D & C" stands for "dilation and curettage," the 
"dilation of the cervix and curettement of the endometrium." Stedman's 
Medical Dictionary 442, 485 (26th ed. 1995). 
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        . . . . 
 
       Q: Did you ever have your privileges at any of those 
       hospitals either revoked, suspended or restricted? 
 
       A: No. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       Q: Did you ever have any of your hospital privileges in 
       Boston or in the Boston area revoked, suspended or 
       restricted? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Have you ever been subject to any disciplinary 
       proceedings by any-- 
 
        (Objection and objection overruled) 
 
       Q: Dr. Sherman, have you ever been subject to any 
       disciplinary proceedings by a hospital or medical 
       society? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Have you ever been named as a defendant in a 
       medical malpractice suit? 
 
        (Objection and objection overruled) 
 
       A: I had a malpractice case about 15 years ago myself, 
       yes. 
 
       Q: Could you tell us what that was about? 
 
       A: It was settled somehow or other, but there was a 
       routine case. 
 
       Q: Was that an OB/GYN case? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: And it was routine? 
 
       A: Well, there was a D & C problem. 
 
       Q: You mentioned that over the course of your practice 
       you were licensed in four states that you told us about. 
       Have any of those licenses ever been revoked, 
       suspended or restricted in any fashion? 
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       A: No, I let them--I let them go because I had no 
       intention of going back to active OB. 
 
       Q: So you let your license in Massachusetts lapse? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: And you let your license in Maryland lapse? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: And you let your license in the District of Columbia 
       lapse? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       Q: Go back to your licensures, Doctor. Isn't it true that 
       you had your license to practice medicine in the 
       District of Columbia revoked in 1977? 
 
       A: Yes, it was. Yes, but-- 
 
       Q: Isn't it true that you had your license to practice 
       medicine in Massachusetts revoked in 1983? 
 
        (Objection and objection overruled). 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Isn't it true that you had your license to practice 
       medicine in Virginia revoked in 1979? 
 
       A: But it was reinstated. 
 
       Q: The question to you, Doctor, is isn't' it true that 
       your license to practice medicine in Virginia was 
       revoked in 1979? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: And it was not until 197--1993 that your license 
       was reinstated in Virginia. 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: And wasn't you license in Virginia reinstated on a 
       probationary status? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
        . . . . 
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       Q: And according to the order of reinstatement you 
       were not to engage in the practice of medicine until 
       such time as you successfully passed the special 
       purpose examination. 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Did you pass that examination? 
 
       A: I have to take it on March 17th. 
 
       Q: Do you have plans to take it? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: But you have not yet complied with that particular 
       requirement. 
 
       A: Not yet. 
 
       Q: I see. If you have not complied with a particular 
       term or condition of reinstatement, has your license in 
       Virginia in fact been reinstated? 
 
       A: Has it been reinstated? 
 
       Q: Has it been actually reinstated? 
 
       A: It has been reinstated subject to that, yes. 
 
       Q: Could you go into the state of Virginia today and 
       treat patients? 
 
       A: I don't treat any patients at the-- 
 
       Q: If you wanted to, could you, with your restricted 
       license, go into Virginia today and treat patients? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: After your license was revoked in Massachusetts in 
       March of 1983, you requested in 1992 reinstatement, 
       did you not? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: That was denied, wasn't it? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Didn't you have a license to practice in Maine? 
 
       A: Yes. 
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       Q: And you made a license renewal to Maine in 1983 
       which was denied, didn't you? 
 
       A: At that time. It is under advisement for renewal at 
       this time. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       Q: Doctor you told us that 15 years ago you were 
       subject --you were a defendant in a routine medical 
       malpractice suit, weren't you? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: You know where I'm going, don't you, Doctor? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Do you remember a patient by the name of Rita 
       McDowell? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Rita McDowell came into your clinic for an abortion, 
       didn't she? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: She was 16 years of age. 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: You performed an incomplete abortion on her. 
 
       A: I did not. 
 
       Q: Doctor, as a result of the procedure that you 
       performed on Rita McDowell, she died didn't she? 
 
       A: Absolutely not. 
 
       Q: Rita McDowell did not die? 
 
       A: She died at D.C. General Hospital as a result of a 
       CVP line which perforated the lungs, and she died of 
       cardiac arrest on that score. 
 
       Q: Doctor, the reason that your license was revoked in 
       D.C. in 1977 was because of the Rita McDowell case, 
       wasn't it? 
 
       A: Yes. 
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       Q: And the reason that your license was revoked in 
       D.C. was because you, as a practice, were performing 
       incomplete septic abortions on your patients. 
 
       A: That is your opinion but not mine. 
 
App. at 58-59, 60-67, 69-70. 
 
Sherman was subsequently indicted for perjury under 18 
U.S.C. S 1621. Count I of the indictment charged him with 
testifying that none of his licenses to practice medicine had 
ever been revoked, suspended or restricted. See app. at 8-9. 
Count II charged him with testifying that he had allowed 
his license to practice medicine in Massachusetts to lapse, 
when in fact it had been revoked. See app. at 10. Count III 
charged him with testifying that he had only allowed his 
license to practice medicine in the District of Columbia to 
lapse. It had also been revoked. See app. at 11. Count IV 
charged him with testifying that he had never been subject 
to disciplinary proceedings by a medical society, when in 
fact he had been subjected to such proceedings in the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
and the Commonwealth of Virginia. See app. at 12. Count 
V charged him with testifying that 15 years prior he had 
been named in a routine medical malpractice case involving 
a D & C, which was ultimately settled, "when in fact . . . 
the Board of Medicine of the District of Columbia had found 
that the defendant performed an incomplete abortion on a 
16-year old girl in order to increase his fees by making later 
surgical procedures necessary, resulting in the patient's 
death . . . [and] the revocation of defendant's license to 
practice medicine . . . and . . . criminal prosecution." App. 
at 13-14. 
 
Sherman moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that 
the government had denied him the due process of law by 
depriving him of the defense of recantation that is available 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1623, but not under 18 U.S.C. S1621. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d). The district court agreed and 
dismissed the indictment. The court ruled that the 
government had unfairly denied Sherman a defense to the 
criminal charges, and this appeal followed. Our standard of 
review is plenary. King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 270 (8th 
Cir. 1994). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Our standard of review is plenary. 
 




A. The Distinctions Between the Two Statutes 
 
The sole issue before us is whether the district court 
erred in dismissing the five-count indictment against 
Sherman. The court held that the government lacked the 
discretion to charge Sherman under the general perjury 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1621, rather than the false swearing 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1623, as the latter statute more 
specifically applied to his conduct, and not prosecuting 
under that statute improperly deprived Sherman of the 
defense of recantation which is available under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1623(d), but which does not apply to 18 U.S.C. S 1621. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1621 states in relevant part as follows: 
 
       Whoever-- 
 
       (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal 
       . . . that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, 
       or certificate by him . . . is true, willfully and contrary 
       to such oath states or subscribes any material matter 
       which he does not believe to be true; or 
 
       (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or 
       statement under penalty of perjury willfully subscribes 
       as true any material matter which he does not believe 
       to be true; 
 
       is guilty of perjury and shall . . . be fined under this 




18 U.S.C. S 1623 was enacted after S 1621 as a part of 
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. It provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
 
       Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or 
       ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
       States, knowingly makes any false material declaration 
       . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
       more than 5 years or both. 
 
(emphasis added). However, the statute allows for the 
defense of recantation in limited situations. Section 1623(d) 
states: 
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       Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury 
       proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person 
       making the declaration admits such declaration to be 
       false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this 
       section if, at the time the admission is made, the 
       declaration has not substantially affected the 
       proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such 
       falsity has been or will be exposed. 
 
Subsection (e) of S 1623 adds that: 
 
       [p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is 
       sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that 
       such proof be made by any particular number of 
       witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1623(e). 
 
We have previously noted the distinctions between the 
two statutes: 1) S 1623 does not require that the 
prosecution employ the "two-witness rule" for proving 
perjury; 2) S 1623 has a reduced mens rea requiring only 
that one "knowingly" commit perjury rather than "willfully," 
as is required under S 1621; and 3) S 1623 is restricted to 
testimony before grand juries and courts and is therefore 
more limited in reach than S 1621. See United States v. 
Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 914-15 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 
In United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1974), 
we examined the congressional intent behind these 
overlapping statutes. We stated: 
 
       [I]t was the congressional judgment that the overall 
       purpose of Section 1623, obtaining more truthful 
       responses from witnesses before courts and grand 
       juries, would be best accomplished by facilitating 
       perjury convictions for those who had violated their 
       oaths. In order to remove encumbrances from such 
       convictions, Congress abandoned the two-witness rule, 
       discontinued the requirement that the prosecutor prove 
       the truth of one of two irreconcilable statements under 
       oath, and required only a `knowing' rather than a 
       `willful' state of mind. The Senate Judiciary Committee 
       described the intent of the Section as follows: 
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       A subpoena can compel the attendance of a witness 
       . . . But only the possibility of some sanction such as 
       a perjury prosecution can provide any guarantee that 
       his testimony will be truthful. 
 
        Today, however, the possibility of perjury prosecution 
       is not likely, and if it materializes, the likelihood of a 
       conviction is not high. * * * 
 
        (Section 1623) creates a new federal false declaration 
       provision that will not be circumscribed by rigid 
       common law rules of evidence. 
 
506 F.2d at 322. (citing S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 57-59 
(1969)). 
 
Thus, Congress changed the law in order to facilitate 
perjury prosecutions. It also sought to enhance the truth- 
seeking process by allowing perjurers to recant perjured 
testimony and thereby escape conviction. 
 
        The congressional effort to improve truth telling in 
       judicial proceedings was thus twofold. Congress 
       magnified the deterrent role of the criminal law by 
       easing the Government's path to perjury convictions 
       and the emphasis here was plainly on pressure 
       calculated to induce the witness to speak the truth at 
       all times. Congress also extended absolution to 
       perjurers who recant under prescribed conditions, 
       admittedly an endeavor to secure truth through 
       correction of previously false testimony. Each of these 
       techniques has its own virtue, and it was, of course, 
       the prerogative of Congress to put them to use; but it 
       is evident that in some degree they unavoidably must 
       work at cross-purposes. Recantation, for all its value in 
       ultimately unveiling the truth, may well prove to be a 
       disincentive to veracity in the first instance; to the 
       extent that a perjurer can sidestep prosecution simply 
       by recanting, he is hardly the more prompted to tell the 
       truth in the beginning. By the same token, the 
       deterrent effect of any statute punishing perjury is 
       weakened in the same measure that recantation holds 
       out the promise of possible escape. And indisputably, 
       maximum deterrence of perjury is necessarily 
       inconsistent with maximum range for recantation. 
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United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (footnote omitted). 
 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
When Sherman testified about his background, he 
violated 18 U.S.C. S 1621 as well as 18 U.S.C.S 1623. With 
certain exceptions, when conduct runs afoul of more than 
one prohibition of the criminal law, prosecutors have 
discretion to choose under which statute to prosecute. 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). 
"[W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute, the 
government may prosecute under either statute so long as 
it does not discriminate against any class of defendants." 
Id. at 123-24 (1979). 
 
In Batchelder, a previously convicted felon was convicted 
of receiving a firearm that had traveled in interstate 
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(h). 2 The trial 
court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment under 18 
U.S.C. S 924(a).3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for 
resentencing. The court noted that the substantive 
elements of S 922(h) are similar to those of 18 U.S.C. App. 
S 1202(a),4 a statute which allows for a maximum sentence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 922(h) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person-- 
 
       (1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any 
       court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
       one year; 
 
       to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
       transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
3. 18 U.S.C. S 924(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Whoever violates any provision of this chapter . . . shall be fined 
not 
       more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, 
       and shall become eligible for parole as the Board of Parole shall 
       determine. 
 
4. 18 U.S.C. App. S 1202(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who-- 
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of two years, and that the sentencing court was thus 
restricted to a maximum sentence of two years.5 
 
The Supreme Court reversed noting that regardless of the 
apparent overlap between S 922(h) and S 1202(a), "nothing 
in the language, structure or legislative history of the 
Omnibus Act," id. at 118, suggests that a defendant 
convicted under S 922(h) may be imprisoned no more than 
two years. The Court further stated that "[a]s we read the 
Act, each substantive statute, in conjunction with its own 
sentencing provision, operates independently of the other." 
Id. Similarly, S 1621 and S 1623 are separate statutes that 
operate independently of each other, and the government 
can normally elect upon which of those two statutes to base 
its prosecution. "[A] defendant has no constitutional right 
to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the 
basis of his indictment and prosecution." Id. United States 
v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 639 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 
However, notwithstanding the breadth of prosecutorial 
discretion, a prosecutor's charging decision cannot be 
"motivated solely by a desire to [achieve] a tactical 
advantage by impairing the ability of a defendant to mount 
an effective defense, [in such a case] a due process violation 
might be shown." Id. Here, Sherman argues that the 
prosecution did just that. The district court accepted 
Sherman's argument that he was denied due process of the 
law because the prosecutor deliberately secured a tactical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a 
State 
       or any political subdivision thereof of a felony . . . 
 
       and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting 
       commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm 
shall 
       be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
       two years, or both. 
 
5. The court based its decision upon three separate grounds. It reasoned 
that the ambiguity created by the two overlapping statutes had to be 
resolved in favor of the defendant, the shorter sentence was contained in 
the statute that was later in time and therefore the earlier statute had 
been repealed by implication, and the longer sentence authorized by 
S 922 was void for vagueness when considered in conjunction with the 
shorter sentence authorized under S 1202(a). 
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advantage in denying him a defense that he was entitled to 
assert by indicting him under S 1621 rather than S 1623.6 
In dismissing the indictment, the district court stated: "[w]e 
are of the view that allowing a prosecutor unbridled 
discretion to charge a defendant under section 1621 in all 
cases where a defendant might assert a recantation defense 
would eliminate the defense and is inappropriate." D.Ct. 
Op. at 3 (citing United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d 
Cir. 1973). Accordingly, we must examine the defense of 
recantation and determine if Sherman's prosecution under 
18 U.S.C. S 1621 improperly denied him a defense that he 
was entitled to assert. 
 
1. Recantation Under 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d)  
 
Under 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d) the defense of recantation is 
available: 1) "if, at the time the admission is made, the 
declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding"; 
or 2) "it has not become manifest that such falsity has been 
or will be exposed." Here, the district court concluded that 
Sherman could have asserted the defense as his perjury 
had not substantially affected the proceeding when he 
recanted. Understandably, the court concluded that it was 
irrelevant that the perjury had been exposed prior to the 
recantation because the statute was drafted in the 
disjunctive so Sherman needed only to satisfy one of the 
two conditions, not both of them. The court held that the 
government's reliance upon 18 U.S.C. S 1621 deprived 
Sherman of the defense Congress wrote into S 1623 and 
that Sherman's right to due process of the law had 
therefore been violated. 
 
The government contends that the district court erred in 
reading S 1623(d) in the disjunctive rather than the 
conjunctive, because both prongs must be met before a 
recantation defense is available. Since Sherman's perjury 
was exposed prior to his attempted recantation, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Sherman also argues that the decision to indict him under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1621 denied him the equal protection of the law. The district court did 
not base its dismissal on Equal Protection grounds, and Sherman's 
resort to the Equal Protection Clause now is meritless, and we reject it 
without discussion. 
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government argues that his right to due process of the law 
could not have been denied because he was not entitled to 
the recantation defense. Thus, our inquiry is focused upon 
whether Sherman was entitled to the defense of recantation 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d). 
 
Statutory interpretation usually begins, and often ends, 
with the language of the statute. Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. 
Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 (1990). "Where . .. the statute's 
language is plain, `the sole function of the court is to 
enforce it according to its terms.' " We look to the text of a 
statute to determine congressional intent, and look to 
legislative history only if the text is ambiguous. Id. Plain 
meaning is conclusive, "except in the `rare cases [in which] 
the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' " 
New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity 
Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1623(d) is deceptive in its apparent clarity. It 
says "or" and Sherman argues that Congress intended the 
statute to mean exactly that. However, reading the statute 
as Sherman argues we must results in a statute that is 
both inconsistent with, and frustrating to, Congress' 
twofold intent in enacting the legislation. If Sherman is 
correct, one could commit perjury with impunity. A witness 
could violate his or her oath in the comfort of knowing that 
no perjury prosecution was possible so long as he or she 
recanted as soon as it appeared the perjury would be 
disclosed. A recantation at that point, under Sherman's 
interpretation, would shield the conduct even if the judicial 
proceedings had been substantially affected by the false 
testimony. Similarly, a witness could escape prosecution 
even after the false nature of it had been disclosed and 
hope to successfully argue that the proceedings had not 
been substantially effected because there had been a 
recantation. 
 
In Lardieri we examined the legislative history of S 1623 
to determine legislative intent, and we are guided by that 
analysis. See also Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 120 ("That 
Congress intended to enact two independent gun control 
statutes . . . is confirmed by the legislative history of the 
Omnibus Act."). We do not believe that Congress intended 
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to "improve truth telling in judicial proceedings," by 
incorporating a provision into the perjury statute that 
would be tantamount to granting immunity from 
prosecution in many, if not all, instances. In Lardieri, the 
defendant argued that the prosecutor who warned him 
against perjuring himself had a duty to also advise him of 
the recantation defense under S 1623(d), and that he could 
not be prosecuted for perjury absent such a warning. He 
asserted that a contrary interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1623(d) would frustrate the "legislative purpose embodied 
in [the statute] to encourage witnesses to divulge the truth 
by permitting them . . . to correct their false testimony 
without . . . perjury convictions." 506 F.2d at 322. In 
reviewing the legislative history we noted that "[t]he 
recantation provision in section 1623(d) was modeled after 
Section 210.25 of the New York Penal Law which codified 
the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. 
Ezaugi," id. at 322-23, (citations omitted) and concluded 
that "neither the New York Legislature nor the New York 
courts have found it necessary or appropriate to impose [a 
duty to warn] on the prosecutor." Id. at 323. 
 
Similarly, we note that, despite the disjunctive phrasing 
in S 1623(d), the New York statute it was based upon is 
drafted in the conjunctive. Section 210.25 of the New York 
Penal Law states: 
 
       In any prosecution for perjury, it is an affirmative 
       defense that the defendant retracted his false 
       statement in the course of the proceeding in which it 
       was made before such false statement substantially 
       affected the proceeding and before it became manifest 
       that its falsity was or would be exposed. 
 
N.Y. Penal Code S 210.25 (McKinney 1965) (emphasis 
added). See also Lardieri, 506 F.2d at 323 n. 6. Moreover, 
the wording of the New York statute is consistent with the 
court decision upon which it is based. In People v. Ezaugi, 
2 N.Y. 2d 439 (1957), Ezaugi, a police officer, was convicted 
of perjury for giving false testimony to a grand jury 
investigating police corruption. In the grand jury, Ezaugi 
had been asked about a conversation he had with a drug 
dealer. Ezaugi had been extorting protection payoffs from 
the drug dealer, but unbeknownst to Ezaugi, the dealer had 
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gone to authorities and was cooperating with a police 
internal affairs investigation when Ezaugi spoke to him. 
 
In the grand jury, Ezaugi admitted to having a discussion 
with the drug dealer but lied about its content. The 
conversation was surreptitiously recorded, and Ezaugi later 
became concerned that the prosecutor who questioned him 
before the grand jury may have known the true content of 
the conversation. Ezaugi then requested another 
opportunity to testify before the grand jury. When he 
testified the second time he admitted that his prior 
testimony had been false, but explained that he had been 
upset, and had not been certain that he was authorized to 
divulge confidential police information. The indictment 
followed, and Ezaugi was convicted of having perjured 
himself during his first appearance. On appeal he argued 
that, under New York case law, "even if it be assumed that 
the answers are intentionally false and misleading, the 
defect is cured when the witness changes his statement 
and purports to tell the truth." Id. at 442. See People v. 
Gillette, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908) and King v. Carr, 1 Sid. 418 
(1669). The Court of Appeals rejected that argument: 
 
       However useful that rule may be as an aid in arriving 
       at testimonial truth, it does not follow that it should be 
       made a rule of universal application, for to do so might 
       just as surely encourage perjury, especially in those 
       situations where a witness does not recant until he 
       becomes convinced that his perjury no longer deceives. 
       It is fundamental that a witness may not disregard his 
       oath to tell the truth in the first instance. Accordingly, 
       we hold that recantation as a defense is primarily 
       designed to correct knowingly false testimony only if 
       and when it is done promptly before the body 
       conducting the inquiry has been deceived or misled to 
       the harm and prejudice of its investigation, and when 
       no reasonable likelihood exists that the witness has 
       learned that his perjury is known or may become 
       known to the authorities. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, neither the text of the statute 
upon which S 1623(d) was modeled, nor the court decision 
that is codified by that statue support Sherman's position. 
They both require recantation before the perjury prejudices 
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the investigation and before there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the perjury will be discovered. 
 
       Inexplicably, though the New York statute professedly 
       was the paragon of Section 1623(d)'s specification on 
       recantation, the latter as drafted set forth the 
       preconditions in the disjunctive. The fact is, however, 
       that the congressional treatment of the recantation 
       provision never deviated from the understanding that 
       the New York version had been basically incorporated. 
       Indeed, during hearings on the legislation proposed, 
       the Department of Justice included in its comments to 
       the House subcommittee an interpretation expressly 
       and precisely paralleling New York's conjunctive 
       articulation of the preconditions.7 At no time did 
       anyone dispute an intended identity between the two 
       statutes in this regard, or reflect a conscious 
       comprehension of a significant difference. Instead, the 
       matter received very little attention, and references on 
       the point invariably passing were woefully inconclusive. 
 
United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1042. (some footnotes 
omitted). We agree. 
 
Although there is not a wealth of legislative history 
available for S 1623, that which does exist reveals that 
Congress' intent was to encourage truthful testimony by 
witnesses appearing before federal courts and grand juries 
by facilitating perjury prosecutions and providing narrowed 
opportunity for recantation.8 Thus, the Department of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Department's interpretation was: 
 
       If a witness recants in the course of the same continuous court or 
       grand jury proceeding, a prosecution for false statements will be 
       barred, provided that the repudiation is made before it has 
       substantially affected the proceeding, and before it is evident 
that 
       the witness' false testimony will be exposed. This provides an 
       incentive to the witness who testifies falsely upon his first 
       appearance to retract his testimony and avoid prosecution by 
       thereafter testifying truthfully. 
 
Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals 
Before Subcomm. No. 5 on the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong. 164 (1970). 
 
8. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 33, 57-59, 109-11, 149-150; reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4024; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, at 33, 47-48 (1970); Lardieri, 
497 F.2d at 321. 
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Justice stated that S 1623 is "an additional felony 
provision" designed to "supplement, not supplant existing 
perjury provisions." Senate Report 617. 
 
Here, the district court held that United States v. Smith, 
35 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Kahn, 472 
F.2d 272 (2nd Cir. 1973) support reading S 1623(d) in the 
disjunctive as suggested by the language of the statute. See 
D. Ct. Op. at 3-4. ("We will follow the holding of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Smith and 
apply the plain language of section 1623(d)."). However, we 
are not persuaded by the analysis in either Smith or Kahn. 
 
2. United States v. Smith and United States v. Kahn 
 
In Smith, the court stated: 
 
       Because the wording of S 1623(d) is plain, simple, and 
       straightforward, the words must be accorded their 
       normal meanings. The ordinary usage of the word "or" 
       is disjunctive, indicating an alternative. Construing the 
       word `or' to mean "and" is conjunctive, and is clearly in 
       contravention of its ordinary usage. Thus, we find the 
       plain language of S 1623(d) controlling and accord the 
       word `or' its ordinary, disjunctive meaning. 
 
35 F.3d at 346 (citing United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 
447 (8th Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
court concluded that reading the statute in the disjunctive 
was consistent with the intent of Congress, because it both 
provided a strong incentive to provide truthful testimony in 
the first instance and to correct false testimony after it is 
given. 
 
       Reading the two conditions in the alternative, as the 
       word "or" demands, the statute creates an incentive for 
       witnesses to correct false testimony early in the 
       proceeding. Arguably, construing the word "or" to mean 
       "and" creates a statutory scheme providing a stronger 
       incentive for witnesses to testify truthfully at the 
       outset; however, we defer to Congress's chosen scheme 
       as manifested by its language which balances 
       encouragement of truthful testimony and penalties for 
       perjury. 
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Id. However, as noted above, reading the statute in the 
disjunctive actually provides an incentive for perjury, and 
even the Smith court recognized that such a result would be 
contrary to the intent of the statute. Moreover, the court in 
Smith did not address the obvious contradiction between 
the disjunctive in S 1623(d) and the conjunctive in the law 
it is based upon. 
 
       Had so drastic a departure from the New York statute 
       as a switch from combination to alternative satisfaction 
       of its carefully developed preconditions been really 
       intended, we believe Congress would have said so . .. . 
       Had Congress, after making crystal clear its purpose to 
       promote truth telling to the hilt, intended the almost 
       wide-open door to prevarication that disjunctive 
       construction of the statutory preconditions would 
       furnish, it hardly would have failed to elucidate its 
       logic. 
 
Moore, at 1042-43. 
 
In Kahn, the defendant also challenged his conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1621, and asserted several reasons why 
he should have been charged under S 1623 instead. The 
government's position there was similar to the position 
adopted here, and included an assertion that the 
prosecution had absolute discretion to decide upon which 
statute to base a conviction. The court rejected that 
argument out of hand. 
 
       While perhaps Congress constitutionally could have 
       placed such wide discretion in the prosecutor, wefind 
       no clear intention that it meant to do so here. And, we 
       find not a little disturbing the prospect of the 
       government employing S 1621 whenever a recantation 
       exists, and S 1623 when one does not, simply to place 
       perjury defendants in the most disadvantageous trial 
       position. 
 
472 F.2d at 282. However, the court did not rule on that 
argument because the defendant had been afforded all of 
the protection that he would have been entitled to under 
S 1623. Id. at 283. ("we need not reach the merits of the 
government's position [here] . . . assuming arguendo that 
the indictment named the wrong statute, there was no 
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prejudice to Kahn. The substantive elements . . . are the 
same under either statute, and the trial court applied the 
`two-witness' rule).9 Since the court did not address the 
merits, the holding in Kahn is not as supportive of 
Sherman's position as the district court assumed. 
Moreover, to the extent that the analysis in Kahn does 
support Sherman's position, we are not persuaded by it.10 
 
Rather, we agree with the analysis in United States v. 
Moore. The discussion there is perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d) that has 
been conducted by a circuit court of appeals. There, the 
court stated that despite the commonly understood 
meaning of "or", the legislative history ofS 1623 required 
that courts imbue the word "or" with the meaning of "and". 
Moore, 613 F.2d at 1040. We agree. 
 
Only if both statutory conditions exist at the time of 
recantation will Congress' dual purpose of deterring perjury 
through more effective prosecutions and encouraging 
truthful testimony be furthered. Congress clearly did not 
intend to remove the twin impediments of the "two-witness" 
rule and the burden of proving which of two conflicting 
statements was actually false only to replace them with a 
"get out of jail free card." Accordingly, we conclude that 
Congress intended to limit the defense of recantation in 18 
U.S.C. S 1623(d) only to those instances where the perjurer 
recants before the "declaration has not substantially 
affected the proceeding," and "it has not become manifest 
that such falsity has been or will be exposed." 
 
Here, that did not happen. Sherman's revelation came too 
late to allow him to rely upon it to defend himself from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The court does not focus on whether the trial court charged the jury 
as to the mens rea requirement of S 1623 as opposed to the higher 
requirement in the statute under which the defendant was convicted. 
 
10. We note that, since we conclude that Sherman was not entitled to 
the defense of recantation under 18 U.S.C. S1623(d), we need not 
address whether the Constitution would preclude the prosecutor from 
prosecuting under S 1621 and thereby depriving Sherman of a defense to 
which he would have otherwise been entitled. It may well be, as 
suggested in Kahn, that such a decision would arouse due process 
concerns. 
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prosecution under the general perjury statute. Accordingly, 
we must reject his argument that the prosecutor's decision 
to charge him under 18 U.S.C. S 1621 rather than 18 
U.S.C. S 1623 deprived him of a defense in violation of his 
right to due process of the law. 
 
The reasoning in Moore, which we today adopt, is 
consistent with the decisions of the vast majority of courts 
of appeals that have addressed the overlap of these two 
statutes. In United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st 
Cir. 1985), the court stated that 
 
       [section 1623] lists two temporal requirements that 
       must be satisfied in order for a recanting witness to 
       avoid prosecution for perjury: 1) the recantation must 
       be made before the prior false testimony has 
       substantially affected the relevant proceeding, and 2) it 
       must be made before it has become manifest that the 
       falsity of the prior testimony has been or will be 
       exposed. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 510 
(2d Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
stated that "[w]e agree . . . that the more plausible 
interpretation of the section makes fulfillment of both 
conditions necessary for recantation to bar prosecution for 
perjury." Finally, in United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 
1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981), the court opined that "[t]he 
conjunctive reading of Section 1623(d) comports with 
accepted principles of statutory construction and is 
supported by the underlying congressional intent." 
 
Here, Sherman answered "yes" when defense counsel 
began his impeachment of Sherman by asking: "[y]ou know 
where I am going with this don't you?" It is difficult to 
imagine a scenario that more clearly demonstrates why 
Congress could not have intended S 1623(d) to be read in 
the disjunctive. 
 
       If the two preconditions which Section 1623(d) specifies 
       are alternative in nature, a perjurer can avoid 
       prosecution by the simple expedient of recanting before 
       his perjury adversely affects the proceeding, even after 
       his misdeed has been laid bare; if, however, both 
       preconditions must exist before recantation aborts the 
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       prosecution, there is much less tug-of-war within 
       Congress' dual methodology for veracity-promotion. 
 
Moore, 613 F.2d at 1041. 
 
In interpreting 18 U.S.C. S 1623(d), it may appear that 
there is tension between the language of the statute and 
the canons of statutory construction. However, "[t]he strict- 
construction rule governing interpretation of criminal 
statute is not [ ] to be woodenly applied." Strict construction 
"cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent 
and legislative history . . ." Moore, 613 F.2d at 1044 
(quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 
225 (1966)). Our prior decision in Lardieri affords us the 
benefit of the legislative history, and that history along with 
the judicial and statutory antecedents of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1623(d) leave no doubt as to the congressional intent in 




The district court also accepted Sherman's argument that 
since 18 U.S.C. S 1623 was enacted after 18 U.S.C. S 1621, 
Congress intended to repeal S 1621. However,"repeals by 
implication are not favored . . . implicit repeal requires a 
`clear and manifest' indication of congressional intent." 
United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1994). 
See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 
       The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among 
       congressional enactments, and when two statutes are 
       capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, 
       absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to 
       the contrary, to regard each as effective. When there 
       are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give 
       effect to both if possible . . . . The intention of the 
       legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. 
 
Id. at 551.11 Similarly, in Batchelder, the Court noted that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In deciding whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e, et seq, repealed the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 25 U.S.C. S 472, the Court recognized that "the Indian preference 
statute is a specific provision applying to a very specific situation." 
Id. at 
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a statute cannot "be interpreted as implicitly repealing 
[another statute] whenever a defendant's conduct might 
violate both Titles." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 122. The Court 
stated that "the legislative intent to repeal must be manifest 
in the `positive repugnancy' between the provisions." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199 
(1939)). Here, no such repugnancy exists. Accordingly, the 
district court erred when it decided that S 1623 impliedly 
repealed S 1621. 
 
D. The Greater Specificity of S 1623 
       Does Not Control 
 
The district court also concluded that S 1623 was the 
appropriate statute to rely upon because it is more specific 
than S 1621. See D.Ct. Op. at 3. The Court's rejection of 
this position in Batchelder, however, applies with equal 
force to Sherman's argument here. See supra p.25. Absent 
congressional intent to the contrary, or a violation of the 
right to due process of the law, a prosecutor "may chose 
between either of two statutes so long as it does not 
discriminate. The only exception arises where Congress 
clearly intended that one statute supplant another; the fact 
that one statute is more specific than the other is not 
sufficient." United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 
(5th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Zabel, 702 F.2d 704, 
707-08 (8th Cir. 1983)). See also Curran, 20 F.3d at 565. 
 
In concluding, we note that neither the district court nor 
the defendant focus upon the rule of lenity, we note that 
doctrine would not alter our conclusion. See Dunn v. United 
States, 442 U.S. 100, (1979). That doctrine would require 
us to interpret an ambiguity in a criminal statute in favor 
of a defendant. However, we conclude that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
550. Conversely, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Court 
noted, was "of general application," id. , and "[w]here there is no clear 
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or 
nullified 
by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." Id. at 550-51. 
We do not think that this determination has any bearing on the case at 
bar. The Court merely states that the one statute is not privileged over 
the other, where there is no congressional language to the contrary. 
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congressional intent is clear and the rule therefore has no 
application. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 120. "The doctrine 
that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in 
favor of lenity is not applicable here since there is no 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the 
district court dismissing the government's indictment 
against Sherman and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.12 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




12. Judge Alito concurs in this decision because he does not believe that 
the subsequent enactment of 18 U.S.C. S 1623 in any way affected 18 
U.S.C. S 1621, and because he does not believe that the Constitution or 
any other rule of federal law requires that charges be brought under 
S 1623, rather than S 1621, in those cases in which alleged criminal 
conduct falls within the purview of both statutes. See United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). 
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